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ABSTRACT
Modern information society depends upon an enormous variety of electronic devices
in order to function on a day-to-day basis. Information and communication technology
(ICT) devices are able to exchange information only if they adhere to common
communication protocols, technical interfaces, and information formats. ICT
standards are the blueprints enabling users to access, create, and exchange information
regardless of their hardware or software choices. Increasingly, governments are
establishing policies to use ICT products based on standards that adhere to principles
of openness and interoperability. Academic analyses of open standards policies usually
address economic and technical concerns. But technological design is also political.
Technologies both embody values and, once developed, have political consequences.
Rationales for government procurement policies based on principles of openness and
interoperability should not be viewed exclusively through an economic or a technical
lens, but through the prism of the principles that provide democratic governments with
their legitimacy.
The overarching conclusion of the authors, emanating from both the theoretical and
descriptive portions of this paper, suggests that movements toward open standards,
particularly in the context of electronic public documents, are highly beneficial for
citizens who value democratic principles.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The modern information society depends upon an enormous variety of
electronic devices in order to function on a day-to-day basis. Information
and communication technology (ICT) devices are able to exchange
information only if they adhere to common communication protocols,
technical interfaces, and information formats. ICT standards are the blueprints
enabling users to access, create, and exchange information regardless of their
hardware or software choices.1 Increasingly, governments are establishing
policies to use ICT products based on standards that adhere to principles of
openness and interoperability. For example, the Union Government of India
announced a national policy on open standards for e-Governance designed
to ensure interoperability among multiple agencies, improve available
technology choices, and avoid vendor lock-in.2 Japan also instituted a policy
that government agencies and ministries should procure software products
that support internationally accepted “open standards”.3 The Brazilian federal
government issued an interoperability architecture establishing the adoption
of open standards, such as Open Document Format (ODF), for technology
used within the executive branch of the federal government.4 Academic
analyses of open standards policies usually address economic and technical
concerns. But technological design is also political. Technologies both embody
values and, once developed, have political consequences. Rationales for
government procurement policies based on principles of openness and
interoperability should not be viewed exclusively through an economic or a
technical lens, but through the prism of the principles that provide democratic
governments with their legitimacy.
1

2
3

4

See Bob Sutor’s definition of a standard as a blueprint in Bob Sutor, Open Standards v. Open Source:
How to Think about Software, Standards, and Service Oriented Architecture at the Beginning of the 21st
Century (2006), http://www.sutor.com/newsite/essays/e-OsVsOss.php (last visited August 26, 2009).
See infra Part V.D.
See Ministry of Economy, Trade, & Industry, The Framework for Information Systems Interoperability
(June 29, 2007), http://www.meti.go.jp/press/20070629014/20070629014.html; Ministry of Economy,
Trade, & Industry, Announcement of “The Framework for Information Systems Interoperability” (June
29, 2007), http://www.meti.go.jp/english/newtopics/data/n070629e.html; and Government of Japan
Embraces Open Standards, Government Technology, July 10, 2007, http://www.govtech.com/gt/
126612?topic=117674.
See infra Part V.C.

42

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[VOL. 5

This paper employs democratic theory as a method of political and ethical
inquiry into the implications of openness in information and communication
standards. Our account describes four ways in which standards can have political
implications:
1. Standards can have implications for other democratic processes;
2. Standards can affect the broader social conditions relevant to
democracy;
3. The content and material implications of standards can
themselves constitute substantive political issues; and
4. The internal processes of standards-setting can be viewed
politically.

After providing examples of each of these political implications, we examine
various conceptions of openness in standards and describe maximal and minimal
definitions of openness as conceptual poles that anchor each end of the spectrum
of policy options of potential standards. We then develop some guidelines as to
the specific contexts in which democratic values require a greater degree of
openness in both the substance of technical standards and their development,
and go on to consider these imperatives in the political context of electronic
public documents. Finally, we describe some selected cases of government ICT
procurement policies based on standards that adhere to principles of openness.
Our overarching conclusion, emanating from both the theoretical and
descriptive portions of this study, suggests that movements toward open
standards, particularly in the context of electronic public documents, are highly
beneficial for citizens who value democratic principles.
II. STANDARDS AND POLITICAL VALUES
Economic analysis is, in one sense, less complicated than political analysis,
because economic examination can eschew constitutive questions about values.
Economic analysis typically assumes that whatever people value, they will act
rationally in pursuit of resources that will provide greater opportunities for
furthering their aims. In contrast, politics often involves struggles over the nature
and priority of these values. As groups adhering to different political ideologies
are likely to disagree over whether any given value is universally important,
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some actors who view their roles as bearing some kind of duty of neutrality and even some actors whose roles are explicitly partisan - are apprehensive
about policy justifications that employ the language of values. We argue that all
decisions of political significance assert some set of values, whether they are
explicitly recognised or implicitly assumed. However, we hope to articulate
principles of technical standards design that are general rather than partisan by
grounding them in basic democratic values that we think are presumed by all
major groups who accept the overall legitimacy of contemporary democratic
government.
Whereas economists such as Rishab Ghosh have provided a definition of
standards appropriate for economic analysis, stipulating that “open standards
should be defined in terms of a desired economic effect: supporting full
competition in the market for suppliers of a technology and related products
and services”,5 intellectual property scholar Mark Lemley more generally defines
a standard as “any set of technical specifications that either provides or is
intended to provide a common design for a product or process”.6 This paper
adopts Lemley’s broader definition because economic formulations potentially
constrain the focus on externalities. Yet both Lemley’s and Ghosh’s definitions
are general in the sense that neither stipulates the mechanism by which an
agreement on the use of the standardised technology arises or is enforced. In
the real world, standards arise and remain in operation through a variety of
mechanisms. A standard can arise from the voluntary, coordinated action of a
group of private and public actors, the imposition of a government, or the market
dominance of a private actor - whether as a result of the exploitation of luck,
first-mover advantages, a natural monopoly, or the less salutary exercise of market
power. Similarly, standards stay in operation for a variety of reasons: because of
the conservative momentum and incentives created by network effects, the
will of a monopolist or cartel, or government enforcement. As our paper is
concerned with the political and ethical implications of standards, the identity
of the actors who design and control standards and the means they employ are
highly relevant to our analysis.
5

6

Rishab Ghosh, An Economic Basis for Open Standards 2, 21(Dec. 2005), available at http://
www.intgovforum.org/Substantive_1st_IGF/openstandards-IGF.pdf.
Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889,
1896 (2002).
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A. Democratic Principles in Theory
Political philosophers have managed to articulate plausible democratic
principles in very broad and abstract terms, despite disagreeing significantly on
their normative justifications and institutional implications. Very broadly,
democratic theorists agree that democratic procedures must meet baseline
standards of equal opportunity for participation by all members of a polity relevant
to a decision or decision-making institution.7 Of course, things become more
complex and a variety of questions arise when we attempt to unpack this
principle.8 What procedures constitute adequate participation in a given
decisional context? When must a decision-making institution be directly
responsive to its polity’s participation and input, and when may it act in a
representative capacity? What is the appropriate decision-rule for resolving
persistent disagreement in a given decisional context? Who constitutes the
relevant polity for any given decision? Should certain stakeholders be privileged
in decision-making? What are the duties of public authorities with regard to
equalising the resources and capacities of different parties to participate in
decision-making? To what contexts do democratic procedures and values
extend? Are democratic principles of equal participation and self-government
primarily applicable to formal and planned forums, or are they better conceived
as norms guiding informal public interactions or even the overall cultural horizon?
Rather than privileging any particular theory of democracy, this paper draws
on the questions these theories raise with regard to particular standards contexts
in order to identify the key democratic issues at stake. As such, this paper employs
democratic theory as a method of political and ethical inquiry rather than a
body of fixed normative conclusions. After we identify these democratic
concerns, we can employ them to consider democracy-promoting principles of
standards design.
B. The Democratic Implications of Standards
The questions the previous section listed as arising from the core principle
of democratic theory suggest that democratic theory is primarily concerned with
certain procedural values in decision-making. This is in accord with the popular
7
8

See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 106–15 (1989).
See, e.g., id.; Robert E. Goodin, Enfranchising All Affected Interests and Its Alternatives, 35 PHIL. & PUB.
AFFS. 40, 40 (2007).
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identification of democracy with voting and majority rule: democracy is
fundamentally a means for peacefully resolving disputes. However, democratic
values are never simply procedural.9 The functional constraints on action, the
characteristics and relationships between stakeholders, and the substantive values
at stake in any decision-making context all necessarily affect our judgment as to
the appropriateness of different kinds of procedure.10 Furthermore, particularly
in the context of large and diverse contemporary nation-states, the
implementation of democratic values requires attention to the general social
conditions necessary for the functioning democratic processes and institutions.
Different types of standards and contexts will raise different kinds of
democratic concerns. In the remainder of this section, we begin our examination
of standards design from the perspective of democratic values by considering four
broad ways in which standards can raise political implications in democratic society.
This section provides examples of these political implications in order to provide
a concrete basis for formulating a democratic orientation to standards design.
Effects of Standards on Formal Democratic Processes
Technical standards have clear political implications when they are involved
in the functioning of technology related to formal processes of political
authorisation and representation, such as periodic elections. Transparency in
these formal democratic processes is crucial to maintaining an overall sense of
legitimacy and civic trust in government. Electronic voting supplies a prominent
example. Vote tabulation processes in elections have historically been available
for public scrutiny, with observers gathering in a room scrutinising election
ballots. Therefore, the question of whether standards for electronic voting
tabulations and information exchange are open for viewing, as well as in a
format that can be readily inspected, raises political concerns.11
9

10
11

See, e.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW
AND DEMOCRACY 302–28 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (1992); DAHL, supra note 7, at 163–75; JOHN
DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 207 (1927) (“Majority rule, just as majority rule, is as foolish as its
critics charge it with being. But it never is merely majority rule . . . “).
DAHL, supra note 7, at 176–209; IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE 21–27 (1999).
See, e.g., Rebecca Bolin and Eddan Katz, Electronic Voting Machines and the Standards-Setting Process,
8 J. INTERNET L., 3 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=945288. See also Jason Kitcat, Government
and ICT Standards: An Electronic Voting Case Study, 2 J. INFO. COMM. & ETHICS IN SOC’Y 143 (2004),
available at http://www.j-dom.org/files/Kitcat-evoting_case.pdf.

46

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[VOL. 5

Impact of Standards on Conditions Relevant to Democracy
Standards are also strongly relevant to democracy to the extent they affect
the conditions under which citizens engage in the democratic process. For
example, Robert Dahl’s influential account of fundamental democratic criteria
includes not only the formal equal right to vote, but universally inclusive,
adequate, and equal opportunities to participate and to understand the issues
and choices under consideration. Standards that affect these conditions are
particularly evident in the information technology context, which involves a
host of specifications that potentially affect citizens’ access to information
concerning issues on, or likely to become part of, the political agenda. Such
standards clearly affect democracy if they prevent or raise the cost of access to
information that governments are supposed to make publicly available.
The archiving of documents is also a fundamental responsibility of democratic
governments, as access to such records is important for holding governments
accountable and for deliberation over the effectiveness of government
institutions and policies. Standards can raise serious problems of backward
incompatibility, non-interoperable proprietary formats, and rapid software and
media obsolescence. Any of these could prevent government agencies from
guaranteeing that electronically archived public records will remain accessible
in the future. Electronic archives reduce information to bits - structured
collections of 0s and 1s. Interpreting what binary streams represent requires
understanding the formatting structures in which the bits are arranged, software
that can read the structure and access the application in which the information
is stored, and hardware that can access the storage medium. Electronic
information accessible today may become inaccessible in ten years because
previously dominant physical media, software, and other proprietary formats
are no longer supported.12 Information dependent upon the ongoing support of
a single vendor is more vulnerable to obsolescence than information dependent
upon formats supported by numerous companies.
Standards that impede or enable access to information and technologies
outside of the conventional sphere of government responsibility or control may
12

See, e.g., Simon Davis, Digital Preservation Strategy - National Archives of Australia, RECORDKEEPING
ISSUES FORUM, Nov. 19, 2002, available at http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/49635/20050510-0000/
www.naa.gov.au/recordkeeping/rkpubs/fora/02nov/digital_preservation.pdf.
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also have significant consequences for conditions of democracy. In considering
democratic principles, it is easy for political scientists and laypersons alike to
focus heavily on formal democratic institutions and processes, such as
parliaments, state organs, public hearings, and elections. Yet the substance of
democracy in the contemporary world extends well beyond such formal sites
and events, and encompasses both the informal interactions of civil society,13
and potentially a community’s culture as a whole.14 Thus, standards that
empower or restrict citizens’ capacity to interact and inquire within their
community’s cultural horizon may significantly impact a polity’s conditions of
democracy broadly conceived.
Standards and Substantive Political Issues
Technical standards can also interact with democratic institutions when
they have significant effects on the substantive issues of public interest that
form the subject-matter of political debate. As Alan Davidson, John Morris,
and Robert Courtney describe in “Strangers in a Strange Land: Public Interest
Advocacy and Internet Standards,” technical standards have broad public interest
consequences in areas such as property rights, individual privacy, and access to
knowledge.15 Standards can also directly intersect with health care issues, such
as the HL7 (Health Level Seven) specifications for electronic healthcare
information exchange and management. Such effects are relevant from a
democratic perspective, because standards can be set by a variety of different
agents. This aspect of standards is of limited relevance to the economic
perspective, which typically takes little account of power issues or the value of
self-governance. However, from the democratic perspective, the question of
“who decides?” with regard to matters of broad public interest is the political
question sine qua non.16 Individuals or groups who control a technical standard
could potentially acquire not only market power, but also the power to make
decisions that affect the lives and interests of citizens who are dependent on
13

14
15

16

See, e.g., JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY (1994); IRIS MARION
YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 154-195 (2000).
See, e.g., Jack Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313 (1997).
Alan Davidson, John Morris, & Robert Courtney, Strangers in a Strange Land: Public Interest Advocacy
and Internet Standards (Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, Alexandria, VA, Sept. 29,
2002), available at http://www.cdt.org/publications/piais.pdf.
See, e.g., DAHL, supra note 7, at 13–105, 112–14.
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the technology. Consequently, if a standard poses significant consequences for
an issue of public interest, the question of whether the standard is established
by a democratically responsive government, a private actor, a voluntary
association, or impersonal market forces raises issues of accountability, fair
treatment, and stakeholder input.
Advanced industrialised societies are accustomed to the idea that their social
systems are organized using a mix of different organisational forms, with the
various actors and institutions mentioned above playing different roles in various
spheres of action. The desirability of government involvement in a particular
sphere depends on numerous context-specific considerations, including estimates
of comparative efficiency (both in terms of allocating and using productive
resources and accounting for externalities), the relevance of accountability and
public input, and the place of that sphere in the polity’s collective selfunderstanding. Society often assigns a robust role to government in either
regulating or carrying out a social function for a variety of reasons besides
comparative efficiency: a society may view government involvement in a social
function because of a sense that the state or the community as a whole has an
affirmative obligation to fulfil the function; because it wants to ensure that the
entire community has a fair opportunity for input into how the function is
carried out; or because it believes it would be morally problematic to give
particular actors unfettered discretion over how the function is fulfilled. Serious
democratic questions therefore arise when non-state actors’ control over a
standard results in the displacement of governmental control over a social
function that society views as primarily a responsibility of the state.17
Disaster response is an example of a function that we view as a paradigmatic
government responsibility. Incompatible ICT standards that encumber such
government services raise questions of particular political concern. For example,
incompatible wireless standards for first responders impeded communications
during September 11, 2001 rescue efforts in New York City.18 Browser
17

18

See DAHL, supra note 7, at 114; Iris Marion Young, State, Society, and Social Justice, in DEMOCRACY’S
VALUE 141, 156–60 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds., 1999) (citing ROBERT GOODIN, The
State as a Moral Agent, in UTILITARIANISM AS A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 28 (1995)).
Homeland Security: Challenges in Achieving Interoperable Communications for First Responders: Testimony
before the Subcommittees of the Government Reform Committee, House of Representatives, G.A.O.-04231T (Nov. 6, 2003) (statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04231t.pdf.
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incompatibility prevented some Hurricane Katrina victims in the United States
from registering for FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) aid online
- only victims using Microsoft’s Internet Explorer could initially access FEMA’s
online registration. This incident followed reports of various Thai agencies that,
during the rescue and victim identification efforts after the 2004 Southeast
Asian tsunami, were unable to exchange documents because of incompatible
proprietary document formats.19
National security is another sphere in which contemporary societies ascribe
particular - and usually exclusive - responsibility to the government. This is also
a sphere, however, in which information technology plays a significant and
increasing role. Besides those national security technologies whose development
the government directly commissions to exclusive contractors, encryption,
domain name system (DNS), and also addressing protocols sometimes have
national security and critical infrastructure protection implications. These
include information infrastructures, water control systems, electrical grids,
financial markets, and air traffic control systems. Government functions, business
transactions, and national economies are increasingly dependent upon the
Internet. A terrorist attack on the Internet’s DNS, or other essential system,
could potentially disrupt some critical information exchange and
communications. For example, in the spring of 2007, after Estonia removed a
Soviet military monument from its capital, some of Estonia’s state (and private)
web sites were the target of weeks-long denial of service attacks that crippled
the sites’ functionality.20
Proposed standards like DNS Security Extensions designed to make the
critical Internet function of root zone management and name and address
resolution more secure involve questions of national security and Internet
governance.21 Countries not involved in the development or control of such
protocols and their embedded policies or not able to transparently view the
19

20
21

See Berkman Center for Internet and Society - Open ePolicy Group, Roadmap for Open ICT Ecosystems
(Sept. 2005), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/epolicy/roadmap.pdf.
See Estonia Under Attack: A Cyber-riot, ECONOMIST, May 10, 2007.
See generally Brenden Kuerbis & Milton Mueller, Securing the Root: A Proposal for Distributing Signing
Authority (Internet Governance Project White Paper, May 2007), available at http://
www.internetgovernance.org/pdf/SecuringTheRoot.pdf.
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underlying specifications could be disadvantaged in their ability to ensure that
such standards meet their security needs.
One sphere that is more complicated is international information exchange.
When such exchanges - and the technical standards that govern them - directly
affect diplomatic relations, they implicate a core governmental function. Global
trade policy is a particularly complex issue: whereas the actors directly engaged
in carrying out global trade are usually non-state corporations, such trade occurs
within a still-emerging thicket of bilateral and multilateral treaties and institutions
that governments are deeply and continuously involved in negotiating.22
Standards are particularly relevant in this area because they can either facilitate
or impede trade. The World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) recognizes the important role standards play in the
facilitation of international trade and asserts that standards should not create
unnecessary obstacles to trade. Intellectual property rights in standards can inhibit
the adoption of international standards and the development of products based
on these standards.23 Christopher Gibson argues that standards are increasingly
emerging as non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and cites the Wireless Local Area
Network Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI), the Chinese
national standard for wireless LAN encryption, as a case study in this area.24 As
such, whereas the trend of the emerging global economic regime has been to
lower traditional barriers to global trade, proprietary standards are increasingly
emerging as alternative, non-pecuniary technical barriers to trade.
Democratic Values in Standards-Setting Processes
The previous three examples of the political implications of technical
standards implicate a fourth area. Technical specifications have democratic
implications with regard to their processes of creation and maintenance.
Regardless of what sphere of public interest a standard affects, if a technological
22
23

24

See generally HANS VAN HOUTTE, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2d ed. 2001).
Communication from the People’s Republic of China, Background paper for Chinese Submission to
WTO on Intellectual Property Rights Issues in Standardization, G/TBT/W/251/Add.1 (Nov. 6, 2006),
available at http://chinawto.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/200702/1171346578955.doc.
See, e.g., Christopher Gibson, Technology Standards - New Technical Barriers to Trade? in THE STANDARDS
EDGE: GOLDEN MEAN 45 (Sherrie Bolin ed., 2007), draft version of paper available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=960059.
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specification is of significant relevance to an issue of political relevance, then
the character of the processes resulting in its formulation are relevant to
democratic values. The core questions democratic theory raises with regard to
such processes are the same questions it poses to all decision-making procedures
of public importance: whose voices and interests are allowed input into the
decision and by what procedures are they weighed? The conditions under which
such procedures occur are similarly relevant: if a standard is being developed by
a private actor or a voluntary organization, then the question of whether the
public can freely access a specification and the records of the proceedings
concerning its adoption and modification is one of political relevance.
Despite the public consequences of ICT standards, some standards
development processes are closed, require fee-based membership, exclude nonmembers, disallow individuals, and provide little room for public participation
or oversight.25 Such barriers to broad and roughly equal participation and public
input are clearly at odds with contemporary understandings of legitimacy and
transparency that democratic publics expect of their governments. Governments’
reliance on standards created or managed under processes that significantly
deviate from basic democratic values therefore potentially raises serious questions
of democratic legitimacy.
III. AN EXPANDED DEFINITION OF OPEN STANDARDS
A. Conceptions of Openness
Economic definitions of open standards specify requirements primarily in
terms of the standards’ effect on market competition and therefore do not
consider the democratic implications of technical specifications. Other definitions
of “openness” are more expansive and account for both economic and political
implications. For example, the European Union’s ‘European Interoperability
Framework for Pan-European eGovernment Services’ was written with the
political goal of furthering European unification and includes open standards as
an essential requirement toward achieving the goal of interoperability of panEuropean eGovernment services. The European Interoperability Framework
described “open” as meeting the following minimum requirements:
25

See, e.g., Davidson et al., supra note 15, at 5-7.
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•

The standard is adopted and will be maintained by a not-for-profit
organization, and its ongoing development occurs on the basis of an open
decision-making procedure available to all interested parties (consensus or
majority decision etc.).

•

The standard has been published and its specification document is available
either freely or at a nominal charge. It must be permissible to all to copy,
distribute and use it for no fee or at a nominal fee.

•

The intellectual property - i.e. patents possibly present - of (parts of) the
standard is made irrevocably available on a royalty-free basis.26

It is notable that this definition includes openness criteria for a standard’s
development process rather than exclusively focusing on the standard’s economic
effects following its development. The development process must be open to
all, maintained by a non-profit institution, and embody democratically-oriented
criteria of transparency and a majoritarian or consensual decision-rule. The
implication is that the standards development process, which might include
public policy decisions, is as pertinent to definitions of openness as the material
effects of a standard. Another distinguishing characteristic of this definition is
the requirement that any underlying intellectual property be made irrevocably
available on a royalty-free basis.27
The IPR policies of some standards-setting organizations have asserted that
intellectual property rights should be available under royalty-free terms, but
many also have adopted policies that the standard be available on a so-called
“reasonable and non-discriminatory” (RAND) basis. Lemley’s study, “Intellectual
Property Rights and Standards-Setting Organizations,” describes the diversity
of approaches to how standards bodies treat intellectual property, but finds that
RAND licensing approaches are the most prevalent.28 Although RAND
26

27

28

European Commission - IDABC Working Document, European Interoperability Framework for PanEuropean eGovernment Services, Version 4.2 (Jan. 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/
Doc?id=1674.
Many irrevocable royalty-free policies include protections such as reciprocity and defensive termination
clauses. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosen, Defining Open Standards, available at http://www.rosenlaw.com/
DefiningOpenStandards.pdf.
Lemley, supra note 6, at 1896.
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licensing approaches are well-intentioned, their implementation can be
problematic due to a lack of clarity over the meaning of “reasonable” and “nondiscriminatory.” Lemley notes that most organisations with RAND licensing
requirements do not specifically define RAND.29 Undefined variables include
whether IPR holders are obligated to license universally or just to other standards
body members; what constitutes a reasonable royalty fee; and what constitutes
reasonable and non-discriminatory substantive licensing terms. In practice, the
requirement for RAND licensing often lacks a consistent or clear meaning sometimes even within the same standards-setting organisation.
In addition to citing this definitional ambiguity, critics of RAND licensing
practices usually question whether the Internet would have experienced such
growth in numbers, geographic scope, and technological innovation if its
underlying protocols (e.g. FTP, HTML, HTTP, and IP) had been controlled
by a single vendor or group of vendors under RAND terms rather than made
available on a public access basis. The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C),
citing the objective of promoting ubiquitous adoption of web standards, has
established a policy of issuing recommendations only if they can be implemented
on a royalty-free basis, although there is a mechanism for allowing exceptions.30
Ghosh notes that royalty-free policies - which may conflict with defensive
suspension clauses in F/LOSS (Free/Libre Open Source Software) licenses may be too strict in some markets like mobile telephony and not stringent enough
for office applications. In the case of irrevocable royalty-free terms, such rules
could produce results such as potentially excluding Adobe’s PDF as an open
standard because of its revocable royalty-free terms.31
Other definitions of “open standards” also focus on the standards setting
process and issues of public participation, transparency, and accountability. The
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has defined open standards
as those that are “made available to the general public and are developed (or
approved) and maintained via a collaborative and consensus driven process”.32
29
30

31
32

Id. at 109.
See W3C, W3C Patent Policy (Daniel Weitzner ed., Feb. 5, 2004), http://www.w3.org/Consortium/
Patent-Policy-20040205/.
See Ghosh, supra note 5, at 11.
See Int’l Telecomm. Union – Telecomm. Standardization Sector [ITU-T] TSB Director’s Ad Hoc
Group on IPR, Definition of Open Standards (Nov. 11, 2005), http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/othergroups/
ipr-adhoc/openstandards.html.

54

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[VOL. 5

The ITU’s openness definition also states that the standards setting process
should not be dominated by any one interest and that a standard’s specification
should be articulated in detail sufficient to enable the development of
heterogeneous competing products that implement the standard.
Ken Krechmer’s frequently cited paper, “Open Standards Requirements”,
expands the definition of open standards further to include not only economic
effects resulting from an open standard’s implementation and openness in the
process of standards setting, but also the concept of openness in use.33 Krechmer’s
requirements include openness criteria for development criteria such as
participatory openness, due process, and consensus. He also includes requirements
for the implementation of openness, including public document availability
and IPRs that are not cost prohibitive, do not favour one competitor over others,
and do not inhibit further innovation. Krechmer’s definition also addresses
openness requirements directed at technology users, including choice of vendor
implementation, ongoing support for the standard over the life of the product
implementing the standard, and backward compatibility with previously
purchased implementations.
Open source advocate Bruce Perens further defines open standards by the
principles he believes should underlie the development and adoption of technical
specifications.34 One of the principles Perens cites is maximisation of user choice
in that an open standard does not lock users into a single vendor’s products.
Another principle underlying open standards is non-discrimination. Institutions
establishing open standards should not favour a particular vendor over other
vendors. Perens also suggests that open standards should be ubiquitously available
and capable of implementation on a royalty-free basis.
B. A Maximal Definition of Openness
These previous efforts at drafting openness requirements allow us to consider
a definition of maximal openness for technical standards. We should state up
front that we recognise that it would be impractical or implausible to impose
the full requirements of maximal openness on most contexts. The point of
33

34

See Ken Krechmer, Open Standards Requirements (Feb. 7, 2005), available at http://www.csrstds.com/
openstds.pdf.
See Bruce Perens, Open Standards: Principles and Practice, http://perens.com/OpenStandards/
Definition.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2009).
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stipulating this maximal definition is not, therefore, to advocate its
implementation universally, but rather to fix ideas by defining one pole in the
spectrum of potential standards policy options.
The most expansive definition of an open standard would encompass 1)
requirements of maximal participatory openness and transparency in
development; 2) the absence of hindrances to full competition and multiple
competing implementations; and 3) requirements of maximum technical
interoperability among heterogeneous systems and therefore user choice. In
this context, an open standard is one that exhibits openness in development,
openness in implementation, and openness in use.
Openness in Development
Most open standards development processes incorporate participatory
openness, procedural fairness and transparency, and a maximally representative
decision procedure.35 Open membership organisations make participation
available to all interested parties without regard to corporate affiliation,
credentials, or government backing and without requiring membership fees.
Procedural fairness and transparency include well-defined, published procedures
for the standards development process, and a public process for recording dissent,
appealing decisions, or dealing with procedural violations. Such decisions must
meet universal norms against self-dealing and procedural abuses. Transparency
also includes disclosure of intellectual property, disclosure of organizational
affiliations, and making electronic discussions, drafts, and meeting minutes part
of public record. As the ITU’s definition of openness indicates, the decisionprocedure should not allow a single interest or small sub-group to dominate
decision-making, but instead require that any decision obtain broad
representative agreement among participants.36
35

36

The following requirements for maximal openness encompass many of the requirements described in
the previous section, as well as those gone into in Eddan Katz & Laura DeNardis, Best Practices in
Internet Standards Governance (Yale Information Society Project White Paper Submission to the
Internet Governance Forum, Aug. 2, 2006), available at http://www.intgovforum.org/
Substantive_1st_IGF/BestPracticesforInternetStandardsGovernance.pdf.
Although some groups have suggested a requirement of consensus, such a requirement is anti-democratic
in many situations because it potentially enables minority dominance in favor of the status quo.
Although democratic theorists have long recognised that there exists no general solution for designing
a decision-procedure that is perfectly immune from strategic behavior. See, e.g., Adam Przeworski,
Minimalist Conception of Democracy, in DEMOCRACY’S VALUE 23 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón
eds., 1999). As such, we do not view the concept of maximal openness as stipulating any particular
democratic decision-procedure, but rather as embracing the norm of democratic representation generally.
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Openness in Implementation
Standards are maximally open in implementation if they meet three
criteria: (1) The specifications are made available to those interested in
implementing the standard and to the general public; (2) There is no fee for
accessing the specification; and finally, (3) the standard is made available on
an irrevocable commitment by its owner to refrain from charging royalties or
otherwise enforcing patent claims to exclude anyone from using the standard
in accordance with the principles of maximal openness, as has historically
been the case with key Internet standards. If IPR relative to the implementation
of a standard has not been disclosed during the development process, the IPR
holder is prohibited from enforcing the patent against the standard’s
implementation. The result of open standards can be multiple competing
products based on the standard, and therefore maximal innovation among
vendors developing these products.
Openness in Use
A completely open standard allows maximum technical interoperability
between heterogeneous products. As Perens suggests, this openness maximises
user choice and precludes users from being locked into a single vendor’s
products.37 Open standards provide backward compatibility in that ongoing
changes to the same set of technical specifications do not require users with
products based on previous versions of the standard to upgrade to new product
suites in order to retain their existing level of functionality.
C. A Maximal Definition of a Closed Specification
In contrast to the many attempts to define an open standard, there have
been fewer efforts to define a completely closed specification. First, we opt to
not use the term “closed standard” because it would be somewhat misleading.
A standard, by definition, is a blueprint that enables users to access, create, and
exchange information regardless of their hardware or software choices. A
completely closed “standard” is really a specification that is proprietary, meaning
it is developed and owned by a single company that controls the development,
37

See Perens supra note 34.
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use, and ongoing changes of the specification. Hence, we choose to use the
term “closed specification” rather than closed standard. A closed specification
is not made available for industry adoption, and is intrinsically not interoperable
with competing products. The following stipulates a definition of a closed
specification to fix the antithetical pole of non-openness in the spectrum of
potential standards policy options.
Closed in Development
A completely closed development process is one in which a technical
specification is established by a single vendor with no avenue for the participation
of other parties or the general public. In this single vendor development
environment, issues of procedural fairness, recording dissent, or dealing with
procedural violations are irrelevant. A completely closed development process
also has no transparency. Meeting proceedings, minutes, and intra-company
electronic discussions are not published and do not become part of a public
record.
Closed in Implementation
Once a specification is developed, it is maximally closed in implementation
if it is not made available for other vendors, even for a fee, to use to develop
interoperable and competing products based on the specification. A closed
specification is also not made available for public scrutiny. The specification’s
developer owns all intellectual property rights and does not license IPR to any
other vendor under any terms. The result of this proprietary approach is that
other companies are unable to develop interoperable, competing products based
on the specification.
Closed in Use
In a completely closed environment, users become locked into a single
vendor’s products. To continue accessing, developing, or exchanging
information based on a closed specification, users must rely on the single vendor
to continue developing products based on that specification or that provide
adequate backward compatibility.
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IV. WHEN OPENNESS MATTERS MOST
The most plausible economic analyses of open standards employ a narrower
definition of openness in terms of a standard’s implications for competition and
conclude that open standards are generally desirable for promoting competition.
As the preceding discussion revealed, democratic political discourse gives rise
to a range of values and potential concerns far broader than efficient competition
and implicates a far broader range of social contexts than market exchange.
Section III demonstrated that “openness” implies a number of social and
economic dimensions. However, as we noted, these definitions indicate two
poles in the spectrum of potential standards options that vary contextually.
The key question in considering the appropriate standards design requirements
is not “open or proprietary?”, or “how much openness?”, but rather “what
openness requirements are appropriate to this context?”. In this section, we aim
to set down some guidelines as to the contexts in which democratic values
require a greater degree of openness in both the substance of technical standards
and their development, and then consider these imperatives in the particular
context of government documents.
A. Democratic Imperatives for Openness
Our observations in Section II concerning the various ways in which
technical standards potentially raise democratic implications can help us
determine when democratic values require greater openness. As that Section
noted, any standard with a potential impact on an issue of potential public
concern can raise democratic concerns with regard to the publicity and
inclusiveness of the standard-setting procedure. The more a standard’s
development process or organisation fulfils the desiderata of participatory
openness, representativeness, transparency, and procedural fairness, the greater
degree to which it promotes democratic values with regard to that technical
context, since these norms make it more likely that a decision process will fairly
and effectively incorporate the perspectives and interests of a greater number of
stakeholders. However, the benefits of open and democratic procedural values
can also entail costs - for example, the time and logistical costs of organising
and engaging in democratic deliberation and decision-making, as well as the
cost of acquiring enough information to participate - and such values may not
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be relevant to every context, or relevant enough to overcome the costs.38
Furthermore, the democratic values that the requirements of openness promote
are far more relevant to some contexts than others.
Section II points to several areas in which respect for democratic values
clearly demands a high degree of openness. With regard to a technical standard
that concerns a formal democratic process, openness in the specification’s
implementation and in the public’s ability to access and amend potential
problems with its implementation are absolutely crucial. The integrity of
democratic processes also requires openness in such a standard’s development
process so as to ensure that the government has the capacity to oversee and
correct any potential means of abusing the process that is affected by the
technical standard. For example, the integrity of voting processes is absolutely
crucial to an elected government’s legitimacy. Transparency with regard to
such standards is necessary to maintain the polity’s faith that the government
that prevails in an election is actually the one that won the most votes. Requiring
a fee for access to the standard’s specification would limit some citizens’ ability
to verify the integrity of electronic voting, therefore resulting in unequal
opportunities for oversight over and trust in such procedures. Such inequality is
unacceptable, as formal democratic processes concern the very basis of legitimate
authority in a democratic regime. Royalties with regard to use of standards in
this area may be acceptable so long as they do not give rise to inequalities
between jurisdictions with regard to the kind of voting technology they can
use, or provide citizens with different incentives for voting. Ensuring full
competition in this area is important if the technology involved in a specification
interacts with consumer technologies that citizens are expected to possess; then,
openness in the economic sense of allowing for full competition becomes very
important. On the other hand, if the technology does not involve any interface
with other technologies and there exist strong reasons for concentrating control
over the production of such technologies, then competition effects may be
irrelevant.
38

Borrowing from Ian Shapiro’s theory of democracy, democratic procedures and the values they fulfill
and promote are, in many circumstances, goods “subordinate” to the activities and values arising from
the subject of the decision itself. See SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 21-24. We do not, however, necessarily
agree with Shapiro’s conclusion that democratic participation and the values arising from it are never
intrinsic or constitutive goods.
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With regard to standards that directly affect conditions relevant to
democracy, the most prominent examples consist of standards that affect citizens’
access to information concerning government decisions as well as standards
concerning government records. The importance of accountability renders
openness of implementation and use similarly important in this context. Equal
and open access to government information serve to legitimate the exercise of
formal government power, even though such access may have only an indirect
relation to the operations of such processes. The retention of government records
serves the same purposes over the long term.
Some requirements of openness of use may be broader for standards that
affect conditions of democracy: whereas standards relevant to formal democratic
processes tend to come into play on discrete occasions, standards relevant to
the conditions of democracy are continually relevant. Consequently, the standards
that affect such conditions must be continuously free of barriers to the widespread
use of the relevant access technology. Democratic values are inconsistent with
differential costs in the form of royalty fees or interoperability barriers that
potentially result in unequal citizen access to such information. Openness in
development is also very important, as the effect of the specification’s design
potentially affects the ability of all citizens to engage in the democratic process
and therefore constitutes a fundamental concern of the community. And as
with standards concerning formal democratic process, if the technology involved
in a specification interacts with citizens’ consumer technologies, then openness
in the economic sense is similarly important. On the other hand, although it is
similarly important that the public possess the capacity to oversee, access and
modify technical specifications concerning the conditions of democracy, the
general concern is less exigent. This is because the potential for manipulation
or cataclysmic failure does not exist in the same way it does for discrete formal
democratic processes.
On a broader cultural level, standards concerning technologies and
structures involving large-scale communication or interaction can significantly
shape a population’s orientation toward social interaction, political critique,
and technological innovation. For example, Yochai Benkler has provided an
account of how policy choices in America during the twentieth century,
including licensing and standards decisions, contributed to the development of
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mass industrial media structures that tended to promote a relatively passive and
frequently uncurious political culture among a large swathe of the general
population.39
In contrast, the spectacular innovation and flourishing discursive sphere
that have arisen during the Internet’s early development can be significantly
credited to the open standards that comprise the network’s sinews. Standards
such as TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) and
HTML (Hypertext Markup Language), which have been openly available to
access and use, have provided individual citizens with the opportunity to
contribute to this innovation and to the flourishing discursive sphere. These
open standards have therefore helped give rise to a culture that simultaneously
promotes individual freedom, communal collaboration, and creative
innovation - values that are helpful to sustaining both democratic and
economic progress.
With regard to standards that do not directly affect democratic processes
or conditions, but instead affect issues of potential political concern, the root
question is who appropriately controls the standard’s development and its
potential effects on the public interest. The greater degree to which an issue
involves a core government function, either because the public views it as a
public obligation or demands broad citizen input, the more important openness
of development becomes. Mission-critical domains such as national security
and disaster response should not depend on standards that potentially allow
private interests to trump public interests in shaping the standard and its
consequences or to encumber a standard’s implementation. Once the polity
has established the appropriate level of public input with regard to a standard,
the resulting procedure will presumably give appropriate weight to the openness
values to be embodied by the standard. For example, assuming that the public
sufficiently participates in the development of standards for technology
relevant to defence or disaster response, its representatives will, after
considering all of the relevant cost-benefit and risk factors, presumably demand
that these standards meet interoperability requirements to an appropriate
degree.
39

YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 176-210 (2006).
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B. The Importance of Open Government Documents
With our theoretical framework in place, we can now consider the particular
function of documents and document formats for a democratic regime and the
reasons open document standards are important for democratic governments.
As instruments of communication, documents play a crucial role with
regard to several conditions of democracy. Their relatively fixed form gives them
a particular place in the exercise and justification of formally authorized power.
Individual citizens’ capacity to access government documents significantly affects
their capacity to participate in and critique public decisions. It is impossible to
engage in successful public debate or reasoned critique of government action
without firm knowledge of the content and implications of these actions, the
latter of which is usually most efficiently assessed either by the government
authorities themselves or by other public authorities tasked with oversight
responsibilities.
Beyond their role in disseminating information, documents also give
government decisions and their justifications concrete and objective reality,
which allow the citizenry common points of objective reference for public debate
and critique. The same information might not as effectively serve as a resource
or subject of debate if not fixed in a document, as it would be costly or perhaps
impossible to obtain agreement concerning the precise content of a decision or
its justification. It is no coincidence that when government officials engage in
unscrupulous activity, they usually aim to minimise or obscure their paper trails.
The relatively fixed nature of documents also serves the valuable role of
promoting the values of transparency and accountability in several connected
ways. First, a written record of government action greatly lowers the costs of
conducting public oversight. By providing a fixed record, documents also commit
government officials to prior justifications. Second, a fixed record makes it possible
for citizens to re-examine the justifications and implications of prior decisions
and to reconsider them when making future decisions.
It is evident that document formats have significant democratic implications,
depending on the application’s context. In general, the format of publicly
accessible documents serves as an important condition of democracy. As we
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argued above, it is therefore necessary that standards relevant to accessing
government documents and records generally remain free of barriers to the
format’s widespread public use. Due to the information technology revolution,
citizens commonly access electronic documents through the use of personal
computers and other consumer electronic devices. Such access cannot be
restricted by potentially discriminatory barriers in the form of royalty fees or
interoperability barriers. Technical specifications for government documents
must allow for full competition in the manufacture of products for accessing
and using such documents. Given the importance of documents to the
communicative processes that constitute the lifeblood of both formal and informal
democratic activities, it is clear that the entire polity has a stake in the
implications flowing from the government’s technical specifications for its
documents.
These concerns may be intensified with regard to documents used in formal
democratic processes, or documents that play a central role in the execution or
maintenance of functions for which government possesses a particular
responsibility. Regarding formal democratic processes, if a government
implements a system of formal political participation - for example, electronic
voting or voter registration - that requires citizens to access and complete
electronic documents, it is absolutely necessary that such access does not
discriminate among users based on their choice of systems, as such discrimination
would constitute a direct affront to basic equality of citizenship.
The imperatives arising from core government functions in which
documents and their formats play a core role varies contextually. However,
given that such domains are typically those that involve long-term recordation
and archiving - for example, the maintenance of national archives or vital
personal records related to basic aspects of a citizen’s social identity, such as
birth, citizenship, and health - it appears we can say that ensuring sufficient
backwards compatibility and interoperability are crucial to these domains. If
such records are ones that citizens or the general public legitimately expects to
be able to access, then the non-discrimination principle also applies. Finally,
security concerns of the highest order arise with regard to documents that record
basic aspects of a citizen’s social identity. Citizens have a right to hold their
government accountable for ensuring the highest order of security, privacy,
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and reliability for such documents. Such accountability is not possible if the
government employs a proprietary or otherwise closed document specification
whose security vulnerabilities cannot be fully considered by the public.
C. Pronounced Implications to Developing Countries40
We have presented some reasons that explain why open document
standards are important for democratic governments and here further develop
how the extent of openness in standards can have pronounced implications for
developing countries. Developing countries sometimes face barriers to
participation in standards setting. Many standards organisations have
membership requirements, impose fees, or may be closed to new members entirely
- a situation that disproportionately affects entities that are later entrants into
information and communication technology markets. Even in organisations
with open membership policies, such as the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF), participants can face external barriers related to language, cultural
differences, money (to travel to conferences or support time commitments),
and technical knowledge. If developing country interests do not enter the
standards-setting process, their interests are not directly reflected in this policymaking process. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is
currently leading an initiative called “Bridging the Standardization Gap” in
order to make recommendations for improving standardisation capacity in the
developing world.41
Intellectual property restrictions can also have heightened effects on
developing countries. There is an enormous diversity of intellectual property
policies among standards-setting institutions, even those in the same industry.42
Intellectual property restrictions can disadvantage entrepreneurs in developing
countries who are later entrants in ICT markets, have not necessarily been
involved in the development of standards, and may not have large patent
portfolios and cross-licensing agreements with other corporations.
40

41
42

For a more detailed examination of the implications of open standards on developing countries
specifically, see Laura DeNardis, Open Standards and Global Politics, 13 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 168
(2009), http://www.ijclp.net/files/ijclp_web-doc_9-13-2009.pdf.
ITU-T, Bridging the Standardization Gap, http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/gap/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2009)
Lemley, supra note 6.
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Implementation of a standard can require permissions, so emerging companies
wanting to implement a standard are dependent upon these permissions, which
may require a royalty payment and legal expertise to deal with licensing
complexities. This paper primarily seeks to address political implications of
document formats, but there are many related implications to economic
development and innovation. The Internet’s underlying protocols have
historically been developed in an open and participatory process have had
minimal intellectual property restrictions, factors that have contributed to the
rapid innovation and growth of the Internet. Developing countries have a
distinct interest in encouraging open standards to promote economic
development and national innovation, as well as to reflect substantive political
objectives.
V. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
POLICIES BASED ON OPEN STANDARDS
Governments are increasingly establishing policies mandating that ICT
technologies used to create, exchange, view, and store government documents
meet various criteria of openness in their specifications. The following sections
examine the rationales for open standards policies within a few of the local and
national jurisdictions that have instituted these policies. Specifically, we describe
the open standards policies of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the
United States, the National Archives of Australia, Brazil, and India. These
examples provide one historical snapshot about how government open standards
policies unfolded in the early twenty first century, but are part of a larger and
rapidly evolving landscape of government approaches to interoperability and
open standards.
A. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
The first prominent government policy addressing open document
standards emerged in the United States in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
In January 2004, the Massachusetts Information Technology Division (ITD)
published an ‘Enterprise Open Standards Policy’. The policy emphasised that
open standards promoted government efficiency and cost effectiveness, helped
ensure compliance with agencies’ technical requirements for interoperability,
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and advanced the interest of citizens. The Massachusetts policy stated that an
open standard has the effect of enabling multiple competing and interchangeable
products:
Open Standards [are] [s]pecifications for systems that are publicly
available and are developed by an open community and affirmed by
a standards body. Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) is an
example of an open standard. Open standards imply that multiple
vendors can compete directly based on the features and performance
of their products. It also implies that the existing information
technology solution is portable and that it can be removed and
replaced with that of another vendor with minimal effort and without
major interruption.43

Accordingly, the policy stipulated that prospective IT investments in the
Commonwealth adopt the open standards described in the state’s Enterprise
Technical Reference Model (ETRM), an architectural framework identifying
the standards that should be used in Massachusetts state government information
technology architectures. In 2005, the Commonwealth released an ETRM listing
technical standards required for all subsequent information technology
investments. The architectural framework divided technology areas into six
categories: access and delivery, information, application, integration,
management, and security. Within these categories, most of the specified
standards were those already in widespread use in the Commonwealth or globally.
For example, the reference model specified 128-bit encryption and X.509 v.3
digital certificates for web browsers and universal protocols such as Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP)/1.1, Secure HTTP (HTTPS), Simple Object Access
Protocol (SOAP) v. 1.2, Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) v. 4.01, and
Extensible Markup Language (XML).44 Within an “open format” subcategory
of the information domain, the model specified the use of OASIS Open
43

44

Information Technology Division of the Executive Office for Administration and Finance Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Enterprise Open Standards Policy (Policy #: ITD-APP-01) (Jan.
13, 2004), available at http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=afterminal&L=4&L0=Home&L1
=Research+%26+Technology&L2=IT+Policies%2C+Standards+%26+Guidance&L3=Enterprise+
Policies+%26+Standards&sid=Eoaf&b=terminalcontent&f=itd_policies_standards_open_
standards_policy&csid=Eoaf.
For a complete list of specified standards, see Information Technology Division of the Executive Office
for Administration and Finance - Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Enterprise Technical Reference
Model - Version 3.5 (Effective Date Sept. 21, 2005).
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Document Format for Office Applications (ODF) v. 1.0, Plain Text Format
and Hypertext Document Format v. 4.01. Portable Document Format (PDF)
v. 1.5 was listed in a category of other acceptable formats.
The Commonwealth’s inclusion of ODF in the lengthy list of required
technical standards for new government IT procurements engendered strong
reactions from various interests. Also referred to as OpenDocument, ODF is an
XML-based document file format for office applications such as word processing
documents, spreadsheets, and presentations. ODF is not a software application
but a technical blueprint establishing common rules for structuring information
contained within documents so they can be created, exchanged, and stored
by any ODF-compliant application. This is somewhat analogous to the
widespread ability to exchange audio files among applications adhering to
MP3 or other audio formats. A standards institution called the Organization
for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) ratified
the ODF specification in May of 2005, and assumed responsibility for
maintaining and updating the technical specification.45 The International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) ratified OpenDocument as an international standard (ISO/
IEC 26300) in 2006.46
The Massachusetts government primarily used Microsoft Office applications
and other software based on proprietary standards for text, spreadsheet, and
presentation documents. The formatting structures underlying office products
like Microsoft Office have historically been proprietary - they are unpublished
specifications not available for other vendors to create competing, interoperable
software products. Rather than continue to use proprietary structures, the
Commonwealth selected the OpenDocument specification, which is available
for anyone to access gratis from the OASIS web site.47 Additionally, the standard
45

46

47

Press Release, Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standard [OASIS],
Members Approve OpenDocument as OASIS Standard (May 23, 2005), http://www.oasis-open.org/
news/oasis_news_05_23_05.php.
Press Release, International Organization for Standardization (ISO), ISO and IEC Approve
OpenDocument OASIS Standard for Data Interoperability of Office Applications (Ref.:1004, May 8,
2006), http://www.iso.org/iso/pressrelease.htm?refid=Ref1005.
The Open Document Format for Office Applications (OpenDocument) v1.0 specification can be
downloaded from http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/12572/OpenDocument-v1.0os.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2009).
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can be implemented on a royalty-free basis, presumably producing the effect of
enabling competing vendors to manufacture and sell interoperable products
and providing the possibility of heterogeneous software choice for users. Recall
that one of the criteria for openness that Massachusetts stressed was multiple,
competing products based on the standard to avoid predicating future access to
public documents on a single vendor’s proprietary specification. In the case of
ODF, some examples of software applications compliant with the standard
included, at the time, Google Docs, IBM Lotus Symphony, StarOffice 8, and
the open source and freely available OpenOffice.
According to Eric Kriss, then Massachusetts’ Secretary for the Executive
Office of the Administration of Finance, the state’s reasons for adopting ODF
included not only economic and technical concerns, but also the political
justification of eliminating the potential implications of giving a single corporate
interest, in this case Microsoft, the capacity to limit access to state documents
through proprietary formats and intellectual property restrictions. Kriss often
described the political aspect of document standards in terms of government
sovereignty. In a public statement about the importance of open document
formats in the context of the government’s obligations to provide long-term
accessibility to public records, Kriss argued:
It should be reasonably obvious for a lay person who reflects on the
concept of public records that the government must keep them
independent and free forever. It is an overriding imperative of the
American democratic system that we cannot have our public
documents locked up in some kind of proprietary format, perhaps
unreadable in the future, or subject to a proprietary system license
that restricts access.48

The Massachusetts ODF decision, on the surface a recommendation
involving an esoteric technical standard, attracted considerable attention and
controversy, including a strong reaction from Microsoft, which had an obvious
economic stake in retaining the large installed base of Office products in the
48

Eric Kriss, Sec’y for the Executive Office of the Administration of Finance for the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Informal Comments on Open Formats (Jan. 14, 2005), quoted in Andrew Updegrove,
Massachusetts and OpenDocument: A Brave New World, CONSORTIUM STANDARDS BULL., Sept. 2005,
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Commonwealth. At the time, Microsoft was also in the process of introducing
a new version of its Office suite, Office Open XML (called OOXML or Open
XML), based on an XML document standard rather than the proprietary binary
formats underlying previous versions of Office.
According to one historical account of the ensuing melee, criticisms of
the Commonwealth’s decision included questions about migration costs, the
standard’s functionality, the potential to disadvantage proprietary products in
procurement bids, the standard’s ability to address the accessibility needs of
disabled workers, and the extent to which the decision was reached in an open
and democratic manner.49
In the ensuing political turmoil of the Commonwealth’s decision, three
critical leaders resigned their posts, all amid controversy. These included Kriss;
Peter Quinn, the CIO of the ITD; and later the new CIO of the ITD Louis
Gutierrez. In the meantime, Microsoft’s Open XML format was approved by
the standards consortium Ecma International, which would make the standard
freely downloadable from its web site. Some of the criticisms of this format
include the following: that areas of the standard are undocumented to the extent
that others would not be able to reproduce key features; that the standard does
not take advantage of existing and relevant global standards; that it is ultimately
controlled by a single vendor; and that Microsoft’s patent protection promise
not to sue only pertains to explicit components of the standard and not
undocumented and implied components of the standard.50
Following a series of resignations, administration changes, and mounting
political pressure, the end result was that the next iteration of the Enterprise
Technical Reference Model, ETRM v. 4.0, expanded the specifications for
Massachusetts’ “open formats” category to include OOXML, now called Ecma376, as well as OpenDocument v. 1.1.51 In Inventing the Internet, historian of
49
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technology Janet Abbate describes how “[S]tandards battles can bring to light
unspoken assumptions and conflicts of interest. The very passion with which
stakeholders contest standards decisions should alert us to the deeper meanings
beneath the nuts and bolts.”52 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts’ open
standards case illustrates how politics and technical standards can potentially
collide.
B. The National Archives of Australia
The National Archives of Australia (NAA) selected ODF as the standard
for its digital preservation of public documents and similarly linked the open
standard with conditions relevant to democracy such as transparency, openness,
and public accountability. The NAA preserves federal government records
dating back to the 1901 inception of the Commonwealth of Australia, and
also includes some nineteenth century documents. The Archive’s holdings
include Prime Ministers’ records, cabinet documents, and federal government
files related to such areas as national defence, intelligence, and immigration.
The NAA describes its mission as focusing on helping government to account
to the public, ensuring that evidence is available to support people’s rights
and entitlements, and that future generations will have a meaningful record
of the past.53
In March of 2006, the NAA announced it would update its digital
preservation software to support ODF. A significant consideration in the NAA’s
ODF decision was how best to ensure the longevity of electronic public records,
as many government agencies in Australia have unreadable electronic records.54
Digitally stored information can become inaccessible for many reasons: the
physical storage medium, whether mechanical, magnetic, optical, or electronic,
may no longer be easily accessible; the software application required to read a
proprietary document format may no longer be available; and newer applications,
even based on the same proprietary product family, may not be backward
52
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compatible with previous formats. The NAA, like other digital archives, has
acknowledged that these barriers to electronic storage longevity have created a
situation in which paper storage, in practice, outlasts electronic storage. The
NAA selected ODF because it believed this open standard, in contrast to
proprietary formats, would support its obligation to ensure the durable and
accessible archival of digital public information. The presumption is that an
open standard that is publicly accessible, developed and maintained by multiple
interests in an open institutional process, and ratified as an international
standard, would have greater longevity, product availability, and ongoing
backward compatibility. An interesting aspect of the NAA’s standards strategy
is that the agency is both a user and developer of the standard - the NAA
actively participated in the format’s development in conjunction with the
OASIS standards group. This opportunity for participation by an expanded
circle of stakeholders clearly demonstrates an advantage of standards developed
through open processes.
As part of its standards policy, the NAA would still receive information in
all file formats but would use its Xena preservation software, along with
OpenOffice 2.0 - open source software supporting the ODF standard - to convert
documents into ODF. Xena, short for XML Electronic Normalizing of Archives,
is XML-based open source software the Archives have made available for use
or comment by any interested party.
Government agencies contributing electronic archives to the NAA’s
electronic repository submit documents in numerous formats and one of the
NAA’s policies is to accept any document format rather than mandating a
single standard. The NAA’s archiving strategy also includes storing the
electronic documents in their original formats.55 This would give citizens the
choice of viewing the electronic files with an ODF compliant application or
using the application that originally created the file. Those users who want to
access a file in the ODF format have the option of deploying one of two free
solutions - either OpenOffice or Google Docs - to view, edit, and save documents
in ODF.
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C. Brazil
In late 2006, the Brazilian federal government introduced an
interoperability architecture establishing the adoption of open standards, making
Brazil the first South American country to officially recommend ODF. Brazil’s
conception of interoperability addressed internal government communications
and information exchange with citizens, as well as the more global objectives of
interacting with businesses and governmental trading partners and competing
in global economic markets. The government established interoperability as a
requirement for effective governmental provisioning of public services and for
efficient economic stewardship of public ICT investments. Three agencies within
the federal government spearheaded the development of Brazil’s interoperability
architecture: the Ministry of Planning, Budget, and Administration’s Secretariat
of Logistics and Information Technology; the National Institute for Information
Technology of the Presidency of the Republic; and the Federal Data Processing
Service, a public company within the Treasury Department.56
Brazil modelled its definition of interoperability on conceptions that other
governments and institutions had already developed.57 Brazil defined
interoperability primarily in terms of a specification’s effects: a structure is
interoperable if it ensures the capacity to exchange information among
heterogeneous systems and provides users with a choice between multiple
competing and compatible technologies. This definition is based on principles
of diversity, heterogeneity, and choice, in contrast to architectures that result
in single vendor lock-in.
With interoperability as the overarching requirement, the federal government
established general policies to guide its selection of specific technical standards.
These policies can be summarised as follows: technical specifications must comply
with the dominant standards underlying the Internet, including the World Wide
56
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Web, and use browser software as the preferred information access mechanism;
specifications should be XML-compliant where applicable and adopt standardised
metadata approaches based on internationally accepted standards; the specifications
should have market support and be scalable to changing demands and uses; the
e-PING documentation should be transparently available to the public and have
some mechanism for public evaluation and feedback; and the technology
underlying electronic government services should provide user privacy and respect
legal restrictions on information access and dissemination.
Finally, the Brazilian federal government established the following
overarching technical policy:
Preferential adoption of Open Standards - The e-PING defines that
whenever possible open standards will be adopted while establishing
technical specifications. Proprietor [sic] standards are accepted until
there are migration conditions. The situations where there is a need
to account for information safety and integrity requirements will be
dealt with appropriately. When available, free software solutions will
be considered preferential, in keeping with the policies defined by
the Electronic Government Executive Committee (CEGE).58

Brazil’s e-PING interoperability framework recommends specific
technological standards on the basis of their compliance with these overarching
policies, including the open standards requirement. Rather than imposing a
strict binary categorisation of standards as either “accepted” or “rejected,” the
Brazilian interoperability framework classifies specifications into one of five
categories of compliance. Adopted standards are compliant and have passed
through a formal review process; Recommended standards comply with Brazilian
policies but have not yet passed a formal review process; In Transition standards
are specifications that are widely used but do not comply with policies and will
eventually be replaced unless they become compliant with policies; other
standards are classified as Under Evaluation or, if not yet appraised, classified as
for Future Consideration.
Some of the interoperability framework’s recommended standards, among
pages and pages of technical recommendations, include well-known
58
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interconnection protocols such as HTTP/1.1, SMTP/MIME, SIP, SMS, TCP,
and UDP. In the category of technical specifications for document files, the
interoperability framework recommends OpenDocument (.odt) as well as other
standards such as PDF and Rich Text Format (RTF). It assigns the In Transition
classification to Microsoft’s proprietary Word (.doc) format, up to MS Office
version 2000. The technical specifications similarly recommend
OpenDocument .ods for spreadsheet files, .odp for presentation files, .odb for
data files, and .odg for graphic information.59
In short, Brazil selected OpenDocument as the preferred format for federal
government documents while assigning its installed base of Microsoft proprietary
formats as in transition. The e-PING standards are mandatory for new
information system procurements and for updates to existing systems within
the executive branch of the federal government. Brazil’s policies explicitly state
that they cannot be imposed upon citizens or on government entities outside of
the federal government, but call for voluntary adherence to the interoperability
framework.
D. India
The three previous examples described government policies on document
format standards. The following case study examines a more general government
open standards policy, but one with direct implications for document standards
and public documents.
In 2008, India’s Union Ministry of Communications and Information
Technology released a draft Policy on Open Standards for e-Governance.60
The policy was designed to offer guidelines about the standard to which eGovernance systems must conform, with e-Governance defined as information
technology-based exchanges of information and services between the
government and citizens, businesses, and with other arms of government.61
India’s open standard policy articulated several objectives: to ensure
interoperability among multiple agencies’ systems; to ensure that public
59
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documents and information are available in the future; to promote innovation,
entrepreneurship, and a level playing field for competition; and to avoid vendor
lock-in,62 which the policy defines as becoming dependent on a single vendor
for a product or service.63 India’s first draft policy included eight guiding principles
for the selection of standards:
1. Freely available (royalty free, without patent encumbrances,
publicly accessible);
2. Developed in a transparent and collaborative manner;
3. Ability to create open extensions and subset in standards;
4. Interoperable (including backward compatibility);
5. Superior to standards adopted earlier (avoiding duplication with
existing standards);
6. Conforming to domestic laws;
7. Supporting localisation (i.e., support all Indian languages);
8. Be a single standard.64

India’s draft policy included a strong mandate for the use of open standards,
which it defined as being royalty free, developed in a collaborative and consensus
manner, freely available without any restrictions, and preferably developed in
India or having official participation from India, and preferably having multiple
implementations.65 Another distinguishing feature of India’s draft policy was
the requirement that there be a single standard for each technology domain.66
Government procurement is a significant segment of technology markets,
particularly in the developing world. In India, e-Governance hardware and
software procurement by the Indian government represents a multi-billion dollar
information and communications technology market. Not surprisingly,
corporations with an enormous stake in standards decisions weighed in on India’s
61
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open standards policy. Companies that benefit from open standards and open
source approaches, such as RedHat and Sun Microsystems, responded favourably
to India’s policy, while companies such as Microsoft and industry associations
such as the National Association of Software and Services Companies
(NASSCOM) opposed elements of the policy, primarily arguing for the
acceptability of reasonable and non-discriminatory terms rather than only royalty
free, and also taking exception to the requirement that there be a single standard
for each technology domain.67
While many of the battles over India’s open standards policy addressed
issues of market competition, entrepreneurship, and innovation policy, it is
important to underscore the underlying democratic principles emphasized in
India’s policy: government transparency, equitable access, and open
participation. The Centre for Internet and Society, in its responses to the draft
national policy on open standards, emphasized the public interest rationales for
openness, as well as the technical and economic:
We believe that the adoption of open standards is a step towards the
promotion of equitable access to knowledge to all the people of our
country. We further believe that public accountability will be served
greatly by adoption of an open standards policy by the Central and
State governments. While even developed countries (such as those
of the EU) are mandating open standards in all governmental
departments, processes, and interactions, it is developing countries
that stand to gain most from open standards. Proprietary standards
place a larger burden on developing economies than developed as
developing economies have a greater need to participate in the global
network by using standards, but do have lesser capabilities than
developed economies in terms of paying for royalties.68

The policy development process of open public comment and revision on
the government’s open standards policy itself reflects principles of open and
participatory government. India is the world’s largest democracy. India’s open
67
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standards policy, at this writing, is still a work in process. Nevertheless, one of
the stated objectives of India’s new policy, retained in the most recent policy
version, was to “ensure reliable long term accessibility to public documents and
information”, helping to emphasize linkages between open document standards
and democratic access to government information.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has considered democracy-promoting principles of standards
design ranging from concerns with certain procedural values in decision-making
to the effects of standards design on political authorisation and representation.
Economic definitions of open standards view openness as generally desirable to
promote competition. Democratic political discourse implicates a far broader
range of social contexts and concerns. As our preceding discussion indicated,
democratic inquiry into standards leads not to the binary question of “open
versus proprietary” but to the question of what openness requirements are
appropriate in any given context. Openness is crucial for technical standards
addressing a formal democratic process or affecting issues of potential political
concern such as national security and disaster response. Openness is also essential
for standards that directly affect conditions relevant to democracy. In our analysis,
we emphasised the particular importance of open document standards for
democratic governments.
Furthermore, our selected case studies provided examples of governments
establishing requirements that technology used to create, exchange, view, and
store documents meet various criteria of openness. Our examination of these
open standards policies reveals several themes. First, each government entity
that has established an open standards policy cited expressly political rationales
as well as economic and technical reasons in its justification for preferring
technologies based on open standards. The political rationales emanated from
the desire to promote the democratic values of transparency, openness, user
choice, and public accountability, as well as the imperatives flowing from
distinctly public obligations such as the digital archiving of public records.
Economic and technical requirements of course also shaped these open standards
policies: the government entities were concerned with improving interoperability
between heterogeneous systems, reducing ICT expenditures by avoiding vendor
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lock-in, and promoting economic competition through selecting standards with
multiple competing product implementations. Second, the selection of open
standards occurred most expeditiously when undertaken in a generally
transparent and open manner with avenues for public review and comment.
Many government open standards policies also emanate from broader
“interoperability frameworks”, which establish guiding principles for openness
and interoperability in government interactions with citizenry. Third, the
governments in all four scenarios took the same general role in promoting open
standards. In promoting the use of open standards, governments potentially
could act in one of three possible roles - as a regulator, developer, or procurer of
standards. In all of the cases we investigated, the government entities opted for
the limited role of procuring technology based on open standards. The partial
exception was the National Archives of Australia, which served as one of many
participants in the development of ODF. Finally, governments’ open standards
policies stressed the importance of the availability of multiple, competing
products as an evidential criterion of openness, such as ODF’s status as the
common standard for competing products such as Google Docs, IBM Lotus
Symphony, StarOffice, and OpenOffice.
Both the theoretical and applied sections of this paper make it clear that
document standards have political implications for democratic governments.
Free and open access to many types of government documents is crucial for
democratic government, either because ensuring dependable, equal, and free
access constitutes a condition of democracy, or because the provision or
recordation of certain documents constitute core public duties. It is evident
that the government document standards policies we studied in this paper
acknowledge the political reasons for open standards, as they did not only focus
on cost-efficiency or other purely economic imperatives, but were significantly
concerned with promoting distinctly political values - either invoking the specific
values of democratic equality of access or public responsibility that we articulated
in this paper, or closely related values, such as the principle of citizen choice or
government independence from proprietary control. We can conclude that in
the present context, movement towards openness in technical standards by
both governments and vendors is highly beneficial for citizens who care about
democratic values.

